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Introduction
Orkun Akseli, Joanna Gray and Andrew 
Campbell
The genesis of this collection of essays lay in discussions within 
Newcastle Law School and more widely within Newcastle University 
as we witnessed the dramatic events of September 2007 with the run 
on the Newcastle-based Northern Rock bank. Those discussions 
broadened in scope as to areas of the law and regulation that they 
invoked as the twists and turns of the attempted rescue, nation-
alisation, emergency changes to legal and regulatory provisions to 
deal with the now-spreading banking crisis ran their course. As the 
immediate panic of Northern Rock subsided, fresh fl urries of panic 
and instability loomed elsewhere in the fi nancial world from Iceland 
to the US to the new and emerging fi nancial centres of the Middle 
and Far East, where theories of decoupling began to look distinctly 
shaky. Gradually, more considered post mortems took place and 
longer-term law reform began to be discussed and implemented. But 
the fact that the ripples or early warning tremors of what we now 
know to have been a truly global fi nancial crisis of an unprecedented 
scale were fi rst felt here in the North East of England, a proud and 
distinctive region but nonetheless hardly a fi nancial powerhouse, 
as one of the signifi cant employers and oldest and most important 
large, private sector companies met its nemesis, we thought was 
worthy of marking by contributing refl ections from our diff er-
ent legal backgrounds and scholarly interests. We used the run on 
Northern Rock and the events preceding and following it as an 
organising lens through which to consider diff erent aspects of how 
law, legal processes and regulation could be said to have contributed 
(if at all) to Northern Rock’s diffi  culties, how it was used in the 
immediate aftermath of the bank run, how it was used and shaped 
by the nationalisation, how the fi nancial crisis looks set to result in 
longer-term reform of law and regulatory institutions to prevent 
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its like recurring and, fi nally, whether a growing alternative legal 
model off ers a diff erent and safer legal basis for organising fi nancial 
exchange and intermediation in the future.
It is worth recalling the history of Northern Rock bank, which 
had converted from the legal status of building society to that 
of bank after changes were made to the laws relating to building 
 societies in the mid-1980s1.
The history of Northern Rock bank begins in the city of Newcastle 
upon Tyne in the north of England in 1850 with the formation of the 
Northern Counties Permanent Building Society. Fifteen years later 
the Rock Building Society was established in the same city and in 
1965 these two building societies merged to form the Northern Rock 
Building Society. Both of the two building societies, which came 
together to form Northern Rock, had very conservative histories 
with business models that consisted of attracting deposits from 
members of the public and then using a large proportion of this to 
lend on fully secured residential mortgages. One of the character-
istics of the lending policy was how risk-averse it was. Borrowers 
were required to have steady employment and a sizeable deposit to 
put towards the purchase of a property. In addition, borrowers were 
required to have been saving members of the society for a consider-
able period of time before the society would even consider lending 
to them.
By the time Northern Rock became a public limited company, on 
1 October 1997, it actually consisted of an amalgamation of 53 build-
ing societies. These had all been based in the north-east of England 
and most were extremely small and localised institutions.
To make demutualisation an attractive option to the member-
ship all members, savers and borrowers, were off ered free shares in 
Northern Rock plc. Both borrowing and saving members received 
500 shares each. Prior to the actual vote, the UK media made it 
clear that this ‘windfall’ would be worth a signifi cant amount to the 
members of the society. The prospect of being able to immediately 
sell the shares on the stock market and making a quick, and for 
most a tax-free2, profi t was a very attractive proposition for the vast 
majority of Northern Rock’s members. Other members, who felt a 
long-term commitment to the institution and who intended to hold 
the shares rather than sell them, were generally swayed by the argu-
ment that as they were already owners of the institution it would be 
better to hold an ownership right which would have a specifi c value 
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and which could be sold whenever the shareholder deemed appropri-
ate. As a building society this ‘membership/ownership’ right existed 
but could not be turned into anything tangible. Only if the manage-
ment of the society decided to distribute surpluses to the members 
would the member be in a position to benefi t from their ownership 
rights. Most building societies, including Northern Rock, had been 
accumulating surpluses and retaining them without any such distri-
butions to members. Demutualisation was therefore a way of unlock-
ing this value for members. This was a powerful argument, so when 
the Board of Directors recommended acceptance of the proposals 
for demutualisation there was never any real doubt about how the 
membership would vote3. As Gray points out in her contribution to 
this work, some of those original early demutualisation shareholders 
are fi nding the courts a cold place now that they are engaged in legal 
action, seeking compensation in relation to what they see as that 
shareholder value lost, arbitrairly and unfairly stripped out of the 
nationalised company by what they argue to be a fl awed legislative 
basis for the nationalisation of Northern Rock in February 2008.
The events which took place at Northern Rock and such 
other  well-known former building societies as the Halifax, Leeds 
Permanent, Bradford and Bingley, Alliance & Leicester and 
Dunfermline were both dramatic and traumatic. This is true not only 
for these banks and their shareholders, but also for the communities 
in which they are, or were, based. The shock of witnessing the run 
at Northern Rock live on national television had a damaging eff ect 
on the morale of the north-east of England. At the same time the 
dramatic demise of both the Halifax4 and the Bradford & Bingley hit 
West Yorkshire particularly hard. Both of these English regions and 
their communities had come to depend on these fi nancial institutions 
as providers of secure and stable employment for many thousands in 
the local communities. It was initially inconceivable to the average 
person that such historically safe and important fi nancial institu-
tions could be in trouble. Indeed, because these banks had emerged 
from former building societies it was still the case that many of the 
shareholders were local people of modest fi nancial means who would 
not normally be expected to invest in the stock market. The change 
of status from building society to bank was something that would 
have been little understood by the average person. After all they 
operated with the same names, from the same premises and with the 
same members of staff .
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It is ironic that a piece of legislation which had come into being 
as a result of the Building Societies Association’s proposals to 
strengthen the building society industry, in reality, had the oppo-
site eff ect. All of the major building societies, with the exception 
of Nationwide, used the power to convert to PLCs. It is also ironic 
that this eventually led to the introduction of a bank insolvency 
framework for the UK, considered in detail here by Campbell in 
his discussion of the Special Resolution Regime introduced by the 
Banking Act 2009. Following the publication of the new govern-
ment’s proposals for a reform of fi nancial regulation in the UK, 
considered here by Gray, it is now clear that elements of that new 
bank insolvency regime are set to change further. Nevertheless, the 
account provided here by Campbell is valuable in showing how the 
protracted and clumsy attempts to rescue and salvage value from 
Northern Rock following September 2007 led to the crafting of a 
bespoke insolvency regime for banking insitutions, something the 
UK had been lacking despite the size and systemic importance of its 
banking sector.
After the members voted overwhelmingly in favour of conver-
sion from a building society to a public limited company in 2001, 
Northern Rock became listed on the London Stock Exchange, even-
tually becoming only the second company based in the north-east of 
England to achieve the status of membership of the FTSE 100.
After becoming a bank Northern Rock started to grow rapidly 
and by 2007 had 70 branches throughout the UK5. Its assets, on a 
consolidated basis, had grown from £15.8 billion at the conversion 
date, 1 October 1997, to £101.6 billion at the end of 20066. This spec-
tacular growth rate led to Northern Rock entering the FTSE 100 in 
September 2001. Northern Rock continued to be a mortgage bank 
and by the end of 2006 approximately 90 per cent of its assets were 
residential mortgages7. Assets had, in fact, been growing at around 
20 per cent a year, which was a considerably higher than average 
rate for a mortgage bank and which, on refl ection, should have been 
seen as a matter of concern by the relevant regulator, the Financial 
Services Authority.8 Gray makes reference in her contribution to 
the performance, both of the FSA in its supervision of Northen 
Rock in the period leading up to the bank run, as well as that of the 
Tripartite Authorities in their broader stewardship of UK fi nancial 
stability, itself a contested and contestable concept which we will 
shall undoubtedly hear more argument about as it becomes encoded 
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into law. 9 She shows how the conclusions drawn have led to another 
root and branch reform of fi nancial regulation.
It was clear that Northern Rock’s mortgage assets could not be 
funded from deposits alone. Northern Rock had in fact shifted its 
position from relying on organic growth through a rising deposit 
base to sourcing funds from other sources. This was explained by the 
description used by Northern Rock as ‘a specialised lender, whose 
core business is the provision of UK residential mortgages funded in 
both the retail and wholesale markets’10.
This shift in Northern Rock’s funding pattern gave rise to two 
issues. First, how good was the quality of the asset base of Northern 
Rock? Second, did the liabilities side of the balance sheet present any 
special risks? In relation to the fi rst question, the position was that 
this was not a signifi cant factor at the time the crisis commenced. It 
was only later that the lending policy of Northern Rock would come 
under scrutiny and reveal a policy which had changed signifi cantly 
from low to high risk for at least part of the mortgage portfolios. The 
same cannot be said in relation to the second question. Northern 
Rock had, as previously mentioned, traditionally funded its lending 
from savings deposited by its customers, but by 2006 only about 25 
per cent of its funds were coming from its depositors, with about 75 
per cent being raised from the money markets through borrowing or 
by the use of securitised products.11 It was this change of strategy, 
as Akseli and Aldohni discuss in their contributions, that was the 
catalyst for the commencement of the crisis. Akseli shows how the 
highly technical and, so often misunderstood, private law processes 
of securitisation serve to shift credit risk from originators to buyers 
and ultimate holders and argues that, although much can go wrong 
in this process with room for mispricing and fl awed signalling, the 
process of securitisation itself is not to blame. Rather he argues 
for more coherence and transparency in the environment in which 
securitisation takes place, along with greater understanding of the 
limitations and possibilties of securitisation.
Hamilton, in her contribution to this collection, examines the role 
of the ‘safety net’ of compensation scheme, widely in use around 
the world to repay depositors in defaulting fi nancial institutions a 
maximum amount in respect of monies held on deposit. She looks 
at how the UK scheme was hastily amended just after the Northern 
Rock run and indeed superseded by a Government guarantee of 
all Northern Rock deposits during the course of the bank run as 
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the existence of the UK Financial Services Compensation Scheme 
(FSCS) appeared to have little eff ect on preventing the run on 
Northern Rock, which happened despite the scheme’s guarantee 
before the run commenced of over £30 000 in deposits, subsequently 
raised to £35 000 and then £50 000. She asks the questions ‘what is 
the real reason these schemes exist?’ and ‘why are they subject to a 
maximum upper limit of compensation?’. Is the underlying rationale 
for such schemes genuine consumer protection? Or promotion of 
fi nancial stability? Or indeed a deliberate engineering of the autono-
mous fi nancial citizen and a downward-shifting of the consequences 
and eff ects of uncertainty and risk to the individual away from the 
government/regulatory level of responsibility?
This latter argument has resonance in Gray’s consideration of 
the shifts in regulatory culture and form in UK fi nancial regula-
tion and her conclusion that the emergent macroprudential regula-
tory agenda that is to be designed to deliver fi nancial stability risks 
repeating the same over-promising and under-delivery that has char-
acterised the FSA’s approach to regulation that has followed the last 
 government’s 1997 settlement in fi nancial regulation.
De Cecco explains and examines how EU State Aids law has 
played a leading role in post-crisis rescue and repair of failed and 
troubled fi nancial institutions throughout Europe. He considers how 
the European Commission has attempted to construct a rational and 
coherent basis to the manner in which national governments across 
Europe have supported national fi nancial institutions. He shows 
that discerning a theoretical rationale for many of the post-fi nancial 
crisis State Aids decision that is both consistent with the core objec-
tives of the European Union as well as the need to maintain fi nancial 
stability and the ways in which the processes to maintain that sta-
bility are commonly understood is no easy task. The dividing line 
between fi nancial regulation and State Aids law has been blurred by 
the fi nancial crisis and complementary although the two regimes are 
in some respects, in other respects there are distinct tensions as De 
Cecco shows.
Aldohni concludes by asking questions about the very inner 
essence of modern fi nance, the way in which its protagonists and 
conduits are organised globally suspended above national, regional 
or any other spatial loyalty, and the way in which its measures of 
value have become far removed from discernible non-fi nancial eco-
nomic activity and human endeavour. His discussion is redolent of 
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a question recently posed by John Kay in a Financial Times essay 
in which he uses the historial metaphor of medieaval banditry in 
the trading routes along the waterways of Northern and Central 
Europe to challenge the fi nancial system to more eff ectively locate 
the ‘distinction between those who add value to cargo and those who 
help themselves to a fraction as it sails by. . .’.12 Aldohni explains 
the principles and practices of Islamic Finance and how they are 
underpinned by an ethical and belief system. He goes on to suggest 
Islamic Finance might off er a mode of fi nancial intermediation that 
would not have allowed for the lack of discipline and shouldering 
of responsibility that was apparent at so many stages of the recent 
fi nancial crisis (whether it be lax securitisation practices, excessive 
and irresponsible lending or indeed borrrowing behaviour). Its 
emphasis on real physical assets and its insistence on institutions’ 
sharing losses of economic activity as well as profi ts, he argues, has 
the potential to operate as a brake on the kind of irrational exuber-
ance that so nearly brought down the modern fi nancial system. 
However, he concludes that Islamic Finance in its current manifesta-
tion, albeit a growth sector, is not without its own problems and he 
questions whether it does at the moment present a real and viable 
alternative.
The editors and authors would like to make it clear that the mate-
rial contained in this book refl ects developments up to September 
2010 only.
NOTES
 1. Building Societies Act 1986.
 2. Providing that the capital gain was less than the appropriate personal capital 
gains allowance which applied at the time of the sale there would be no capital 
gains tax to pay unless the seller had made other capital gains during the relevant 
tax year.
 3. Interestingly, not all votes to demutualise have succeeded. For example, the 
members of the UK’s largest building society, the Nationwide, voted against 
demutualisation. For judicial discussion of the nature of an organisation mem-
ber’s right to receive payment upon its demutualisation see Needler Financial 
Services Ltd v Taber Chancery Division [2002] 3 All ER 501; Money Markets 
International Stockbrokers Ltd (in liquidation) v London Stock Exchange Ltd 
and another Chancery Division [2001] 4 All ER 223.
 4. The former Leeds Permanent Building Society had previously merged with the 
Halifax.
 5. Twenty-one of these are in the north east of England, as is the head offi  ce.
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 6. Northern Rock Annual Report 2006 p. 31.
 7. Ibid. p. 82.
 8. Hereafter ‘FSA’. There has been much criticism of the role played by the 
Financial Services Authority, but it is beyond the scope of this chapter to con-
sider regulatory aspects. For further reading on this see the report of the House 
of Commons Treasury Select Committee The Run on the Rock (5th Report of 
Session 2007/08,House of Commons, January 2008).
 9. An unsuccessful attempt was made with the backing of the Icelandic 
Government to argue that the UK Treasury had been wrong in its interpreta-
tion and application of its powers of emergency intervention used to intervene 
in the UK subsidiary of the Icelandic bank Kaupthing hf when it judged it 
could do so for the legislative purpose of ‘.. maintaining the stability of the UK 
fi nancial system in circumstances where the Treasury consider that there would 
be a serious threat to its stability if the order were not made. . . .’ Contained in 
section 2 of the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008
10. Report Northern Rock Community (Northern Rock, 2006) p. 9.
11. For detailed information on this see the Run on the Rock supra note 10.
12. Kay, John ‘On guard against the robber barons of the Rhine’ Financial Times, 
18 August 2010.
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